and under-inclusive -in that it may fail to catch dangerous individuals who do not fall into the suspect racial category.
The Chief Constable of the British Transport Police, in the wake of the July 7, 2005 bombings in the London Underground, put the state position on the subject succinctly:
Intelligence-led stop and searches have got to be the way ... We should not waste time searching old white ladies. It is going to be disproportionate. It is going to be young men, not exclusively, but it may be disproportionate when it comes to ethnic groups. 4 The position of those young, male Asians might be put just as succinctly: whatever their reason for doing it, the police systematically treat us worse than white people, in a stigmatising way, and the law should offer some kind of meaningful protection against that. 5 In light of the challenges that intelligence-led profiling poses to provisions against government discrimination, this paper discusses the extent to which, and why, such protections must incorporate a protective, or effects-based, definition of discrimination, coupled with a requirement of proportionate action. Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (-ECHR‖), 6 as applied in the UK through the Human Kingdom (2010) . The ECtHR found that a UK stop and search power authorised by the Terrorism Act 2000 was not -in accordance with the law‖, noting the absence of any safeguards against racial targeting or restrictions to ensure proportionality in its application. 6 Article 14 provides: ‗The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.'
The argument set out in this paper, and the comparison employed to support it, focuses exclusively on the work that can be done by constitutional (or in the ECHR context quasi-constitutional) anti-discrimination provisions. It makes no empirical claims about the relative effectiveness of US and UK law in dealing with racial profiling or intelligence-led policing. It also falls outside the scope of this paper to examine, for example, statutory, regulatory, or soft-law approaches to dealing with profiling. It is
concerned instead with what kind of constitutional equality jurisprudence has the best chance of subjecting profiling practices to judicial scrutiny. To this end, Section II below explains the context in which intelligence-led policing flourishes, and how this discussion contributes to the profiling debate in both the US and the UK. Section III introduces the Article 14 analysis and sets out its strengths in comparison to the EPC. Section IV argues for a particular approach to the application of Article 14 proportionality to profiling, a practice with which Article 14 has yet to grapple in the UK. Finally, Section V will illustrate the impact an Article 14-style analysis would have on EPC jurisprudence by subjecting US cases to Article 14 scrutiny.
We turn first to the context: the threat of global terrorism and the pre-emptive security policy that has emerged to deal with it. The purpose of this discussion is firstly to 7 The Human Rights Act is a statute which gives effect in UK domestic law to the UK's international law obligations under the ECHR. See below at 00-00. 8 This provides, as relevant: ‗No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' 5 explain how -intelligence-led policing‖ is related to the particular nature of the risk represented by terrorism and the perception of that risk by policy makers and the public;
secondly, we seek to point out how the disproportionate fear generated by the terrorist threats can lead both policy-makers and the public to disregard traditional civil libertarian safeguards for suspect individuals, making the role of the judiciary of particular importance in this area.
II. The Context of the Debate about Intelligence-Led Policing and Profiling
In the age of the ‗war on terror,' we are increasingly told by governments and some commentators 9 that we live in a state of exceptionalism. The risks posed by international jihadist terrorism are said to be of a different order from those previously encountered. As Tony Blair put it, ‗the rules of the game are changing:' 10 not only, we are told, do we face a different order of threat, but our response must be prepared to put aside traditional constraints upon the ability of the executive branch to protect usconstraints represented by human rights norms, in particular the rights to liberty and a fair trial. The UK response to this threat has consisted of a torrent of anti-terrorist measures, starting with the Act of 2000 -five major Acts in six years. A similar phenomenon may be seen in numerous other jurisdictions: for example even though Australia has suffered no attacks on its soil in the last twenty years, the previous Howard Government secured the passage of no less than 44 separate anti-terrorism statutes between 2002 and 2007. 11 The nature of this response is of course strongly linked to the particularly amplified public and governmental response to the risk of terrorist attacks. As Victor Ramraj puts it, -…all too often, policy responses are motivated by a widespread public caused by terrorist attacks in the UK in the last decade dwarfs the low-key continuing concern generated by the 21,000 deaths on the roads in that period. 17 The same could be said but even more strongly about the extraordinarily far-reaching US response to 9/11 itself.
Such responses are partly explicable because the strong emotions generated by terrorist attacks leads to the phenomenon termed -probability neglect‖, whereby people focus upon -the terrible consequences if risks were to re-materialise, rather than the remote risk that they will‖. Not only is the new legislation often hastily enacted and driven by fear -that fear has also changed the legislation's aim and method. The key characteristic of much new anti-terrorism legislation is its shift away from the criminal justice model of punishing committed offences through the ordinary criminal courts to a strategy of pre-emption:
measures are taken against individuals based upon an assessment of the risk they pose, in other words of their likely future conduct. Lucia Zedner refers to this as a move towards a ‗pre-crime society' based on the ‗logic of security', which has started to overshadow the ‗post-crime orientation of criminal justice'. 23 In other words, we have a shift from a postcrime system, based on criminal offences, proof and punishment, to a pre-crime society, based on risk-assessment, suspicion and pre-emption. As David Dyzenhaus has put it:
-The potentially horrific outcomes of terrorist action are seen to mandate a pre- In this kind of atmosphere, it is of crucial importance that the constitutional constraints on coercive state powers, especially those intended to protect -them‖-the minority ‖other‖ -have the strength to impose real obstacles to the fearful will of majoritarian pro-security opinion. Contrasting the US and UK constitutional approaches to protecting against government discrimination provides illustrations of the two dominant models for constraining majority targeting of ethnic or religious minorities.
The US side represents the prosecutorial model: a constitutional provision that seeks only to prosecute intentional mistreatment, and only when that mistreatment could have been avoided without undermining the achievement of the state objective. The UK side of the comparison shows the protective/proportionate model-or at least the potential for itwhich recognises discrimination as the experience of distinct treatment, regardless of motive, and allows it only when the burden on the minority is proportionate to the benefits to the society.
Racial and religious profiling in counter-terrorism efforts furnish illustrative examples of the kind of intelligence-led, proactive measure that might satisfy the US model, but should nevertheless fail a proportionality assessment under Article 14 ECHR.
We do not develop a detailed definition of -racial and religious profiling,‖ because our analysis is concerned less with the nature of the phenomenon than with approaches to Two circumstances make profiling in counter-terrorism efforts particularly interesting for the purpose of this comparison. First of all, countering the threat of terrorism will almost always represent a compelling state interest, 55 that is, one that is legally capable of justifying discriminatory treatment. Second, terrorism presents such an elusive target for law-enforcement efforts that often it seems that the only effective actions the state can take must employ broad generalizations that impose burdens on specific groups (and consequently on society as a whole). 56 These facts mean that profiling can be defended on the ground that it pursues a compelling interest through a means as narrowly tailored as possible without forfeiting its law-enforcement effectiveness, which will strike many as an ethically or legally sufficient justification.
However, accepting such a justification ignores the possibility that in some circumstances profiling will impose an individual, group, or societal burden that is so unacceptable that the EPC and Article 14 analyses work. Section IV will then make some arguments about how Article 14 should be applied under the HRA in the UK, and Section V will look at US profiling cases that got nowhere under the EPC, and assess how they would fare under the analysis we propose. In doing this we do not purport to offer up a fully developed legal model for analysing racial or religious profiling, but merely to begin a discussion about how a protective approach to controlling state discrimination, that requires any disparate treatment to procure benefits proportional to the individual and social costs imposed by it, can more effectively deal with profiling than a prosecutorial, one-sided scrutiny approach.
III. The Analysis under the EPC and Article 14
Under the US EPC, which purports to guarantee the -equal protection of the laws,‖ 57 it is only when a state measure or decision represents intentional discrimination on the basis of a -suspect classification‖ like race or religion that Supreme Court jurisprudence requires the application of strict scrutiny to that measure. 58 In the absence of strict scrutiny, measures very seldom violate the EPC, so a finding of discrimination on the basis of a suspect classification is a virtual necessity for a successful claim. can apply, the challenged measure must affect another Convention-protected right.
Fortunately for this discussion, most racial and religious profiling in the context of counter-terrorism will engage either the right to liberty (Article 5), to privacy (Article 8),
to free exercise of religion (Article 9), or to freedom of association (Article 11). 70 In other respects, however, Article 14 can apply more broadly than the EPC because it is -protective‖ as opposed to -prosecutorial.‖ In other words, Article 14 promises to protect residents of ECHR-signatory states from experiencing inequality of treatment; in contrast, a prosecutorial anti-discrimination provision like the EPC seeks to define -discriminatory conduct,‖ and focuses on whether a challenged measure was the product of such conduct. Article 14 attempts to identify unequal treatment resulting from state action-however motivated-and to put a stop to it if its impacts outweigh its benefits to society.
There is little -legislative history‖ of how the Council of Europe arrived at the particular formulation it adopted for Article 14 in 1950, but it is known that the penultimate version put up for debate read -The rights and freedoms defined in this Justification depends on whether the challenged measure pursues a legitimate state objective, and is proportionate to that objective.
IV. How Article 14 proportionality should work under the HRA
Proportionality entered into European law through German law, which developed a doctrine of proportionality requiring that state acts or measures be (1) suitable to achieve a legitimate purpose, (2) necessary to achieve that purpose, and (3) were not detained (regardless of the risk they posed), while those without UK nationality, but who could not be deported for fear of torture in their home countries, were imprisoned. In order to impose this burden on liberty in contravention of Article 5 ECHR, the government was required temporarily to suspend the operation of Article 5 on the ground of the -national emergency‖ it claimed was represented by the global terrorist threat following 9/11 -a process known as -derogation‖. 85 The House of Lords issued a declaration of incompatibility (which ultimately resulted in a change in the relevant law)
in part because the mechanism by which the state sought to -narrowly tailor‖ its interference with rights had impacts that were simply intolerable. Derogation under the circumstances of the case was only allowed to the extent -strictly required‖ by the emergency. 86 The Government contended that non-nationals were considered more of a threat, and that therefore the detention of the non-nationals was all that was -strictly whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.
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This formulation of course assumes that if means are -necessary to accomplish the objective,‖ then they automatically satisfy the proportionality test, however draconian their effects. In other words, the de Freitas test does not appear to allow courts to find that even though the measures taken go no further than necessary to further the objective, the damaging effects are simply too grave to allow the measure to pass muster.
Unfortunately UK courts have been citing de Freitas for years without appearing to notice the missing reference to, well, proportionality (proportionality in the narrower, balancing sense between the need for the measure and the damaging effects it has).
When the discrepancy was brought to their attention in Huang, the Lords brusquely acknowledged the mistake: 
24
This formulation has been widely cited and applied. But counsel for the applicants (with the support of Liberty, in a valuable written intervention) suggested that the formulation was deficient in omitting reference to…the need to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups. This is indeed an aspect which should never be overlooked or discounted.
[The House noted that in a previous judgment it had said] that the judgment on proportionality:
"must always involve the striking of a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community which is inherent in the whole of the Convention. The severity and consequences of the interference will call for careful assessment at this stage.".
‗If, as counsel suggest, insufficient attention has been paid to this requirement, the failure should be made good.
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As correct as it clearly is, this passage treats the absence of an -overriding requirement‖ of proportionality from a -widely cited and applied‖ test as if it requires nothing more than a quick reminder to the courts not to do it again. The opinion says nothing about how the proper balance should be struck, leaving doubt that any great sea change has occurred.
Skepticism about the Lords' commitment to weighing impacts stems from more than the fact that they stopped short of providing guidance on what to weigh, how to assign values, and how to strike the balance. 92 In another recent case, involving the right to religious freedom under Article 9 ECHR, the Lords made similar statements, striking the perfect note about proportionality, and then proceeded to apply it without any mention of the impacts of the alleged discrimination. [19] . 92 The case involved instructions to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal on how to review immigration decisions. The opinion urged the tribunal carefully to consider the petitioner's evidence, indicating that this could be decisive. However, the opinion offers no help on how to apply the principle of proportionality stricto sensu.
proportionality part of the analysis, they must not merely examine whether the decisionmaker performed the correct inquiry, they must perform it themselves:
The domestic court must now make a value judgment, an evaluation, by reference to the circumstances prevailing at the relevant time. Proportionality must be judged objectively, by the court. As Although all of the foregoing House of Lords pronouncements illustrate the difference in potential between proportionality and strict scrutiny, they do not demonstrate the true potential of proportionality. For example, the impact upon terrorist suspects of detention without trial in A and Ors was easy for the Law Lords to understand. They did not need social sciences literature to prove to them that incarcerating non-nationals while letting similarly situated nationals go free brought the law into disrepute, violated compelling interests in equality and social inclusion, and very probably created resentments among resident non-nationals. They were directed by proportionality to give the impacts a weight, and to balance them against the benefits, so (the other members of the majority followed suit).
26 they gave the impacts the substantial weight they obviously deserved. But for proportionality to come fully into its own, courts must be open to having non-obvious impacts proved to them by expert evidence.
Human rights advocates in the UK must force the impact side of proportionality into the forefront of the jurisprudence of Article 14. The proportionality rubric provides a basis for demanding that courts not only recognise that impacts can outweigh even well-intentioned and narrowly tailored laws, but that they pay as much attention to assigning a fair weight to those impacts as they currently do to assessing the quality of challenged legislation. Article 14's character as a protective, as opposed to prosecutorial, anti-discrimination provision is well established. 96 This attribute, coupled with a robust application of proportionality, makes Article 14 capable of reaching any situation where state action has the effect of exposing people to different treatment because of their race or religion, and can in effect set the level of scrutiny to which the state measure will be subjected on a case-by-case basis, depending not on a one-size-fits-all suspect classification, but on the impacts of the discriminatory measure.
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V. Protection and Proportionality v Prosecution and Strict Scrutiny
Nothing in the language of the Equal Protection Clause would lead one to suspect that it offers any less protection from discrimination than Article 14. (2000), paras C14-20-C14-23. 97 We leave it for another paper to explore the potential under Article 14 for some uses of profiling to be more likely to pass muster than under the EPC, because the impact is sufficiently light as to be outweighed by less than a compelling state interest. Asians or Arabs was explained by the fact that they matched the intelligence estimate of likely perpetrators of terrorist acts. This is precisely the kind of reason that can rebut the inference of discrimination generated by statistics: it demonstrates an intent other than the intent to discriminate on the basis of race. In other words, it is the fact that proof of discriminatory intent is required to establish prima facie discrimination (as opposed to taking account of intent in the application of strict scrutiny) that excuses intelligence-led policing from scrutiny under the EPC.
This is an important distinction in relation to Article 14, which will require a justification involving -very weighty reasons‖ as long as the facts disclose (1) that like cases were treated unlike or (2) that unlike cases were treated alike, and (3) that ‗but for' 98 See, eg, Washington v Davis, 426 US 229, 239 (1976) . 99 481 US 279, 292-293 (1987) (holding that statistical proof of a strong correlation between race and subjection to the death penalty could not support an inference of discrimination in the absence of proof that -the decision makers in [this] case acted with a discriminatory purpose‖). 100 517 US 456, 458-459 (1996) (finding that proof that every person prosecuted for the relevant offence in the relevant year was African-American could not furnish evidence of discriminatory prosecution, in the absence of proof that at least one similarly situated white person was not prosecuted). 101 See, eg, McCleskey 481 US at 293-294. 102 New Jersey v Pedro Soto 324 N.J Super 66, 83-84 (1996) Harcourt argues that the court should have treated the case as one of race discrimination requiring strict scrutiny. Tellingly, however, he appears to assume that the mass stops and interrogations in Oneonta would have satisfied strict scrutiny. His quarrel was not with the result, but with how the court got there. His claim was that the extent to which a particular kind of information -narrows down the suspect pool‖ is a matter of the effectiveness of the measure, and whether it is -narrowly tailored‖ to achieving the compelling state interest. If it reliably and significantly narrows the pool, it is narrowly tailored to its objective. This is consistent with the orthodox approach under the EPC, which does not take into account the extent of the impact of the measure as a separate consideration. The requirement that a measure be narrowly tailored takes impact into account, but only insofar as it can be shown that the state could achieve its aim with less impact, and thus that the challenged measure was not, in fact, narrowly tailored. The
Oneonta profile could satisfy strict scrutiny because (1) believe that the burglar came from and remained in the vicinity), the method seems to fit the objective like a glove. 115 The police could not very well check just half of the young black men because that could easily deprive the investigation of 100% of its effectiveness.
One could argue that the impacts of the mass interrogations would undermine future law enforcement efforts and thus were not narrowly tailored, but that is a fudge:
what really bothers one about the case is not one's fear for the future success of law enforcement but the simple, gut-level wrongness of treating every young black man in a small American town as a potential criminal. The act itself is just so blunt and divisive, so destructive of social inclusion for reasons unconnected to law enforcement objectives, REV 1075 REV , 1082 REV , 1108 REV -1124 REV (2001 .
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that it simply should not be tolerated. The need, imposed by the EPC rubric, to weave such intolerable impacts into the narrow tailoring analysis requires sympathetic courts to engage in embarrassing pettifoggery to get to the -right‖ result, and allows unsympathetic courts simply not to see the problem.
An EPC analysis performed by the US Supreme Court as currently constituted could quite easily wave the Oneonta investigation through strict scrutiny, assuming that there really were no less restrictive means of pursuing the investigation effectively, and of taking useful advantage of the eyewitness account. And of course, in fact, it never got to strict scrutiny because somehow separating black students out from white classmates in identical situations in every respect except skin colour was not found to amount to prima facie racial discrimination under the EPC. In contrast, Article 14 would have found discrimination in such a situation, and required the state to proffer a proportionality justification complete with -weighty reasons‖. This proportionality justification should fail because the impact, on individual rights, group rights, and society in general, of interrogating every young black man in a small American town simply outweighs the state's interest in catching one small-time burglar. Proportionality would not treat all policing objectives as having the same -compelling‖ weight, but would ask on a case by case basis whether the law enforcement aim at issue justified the burden imposed. This analysis could take into account evidence of inflated perceptions of risk, which might undermine state claims of a compelling need for action. Following that rubric even the Oneonta court would find it hard to conclude that the need to find people to question about a thwarted burglary outweighed the social and individual impacts of the police's sweep of the town.
VI. Conclusion
Law enforcement efforts to uncover terrorist plots and to prevent terrorists from bringing weapons or explosives into public places or transportation networks can always be characterized as pursuing a -compelling state interest‖. The fact that counterterrorism officers have so few avenues for identifying who might perpetrate these acts means that police will often have no effective alternative means of pursuing that interest 33 other than, for example, stopping and searching young, South Asian or obviously Muslim men carrying backpacks into the London Underground. In the face of this kind of challenge the Equal Protection Clause seems a very crude tool. Once the state's objective clears the one-size-fits-all -compelling‖ threshold, it triggers a one-sided -narrowly tailored‖ analysis which scrutinizes the measure or act only from the perspective of the state or the police, offering no place in its framework for a nuanced balancing of the interests of the state against the interests of affected minorities and against burdens on the social fabric. A finding that the need to fight terrorism is -compelling‖ fails adequately to reflect the atmosphere in which inflated perceptions of risk can make a variety of hastily conceived and ill-considered measures appear compelling. The Equal Protection
Clause as currently applied simply has no way to deal with regulatory or enforcement distinctions driven by (at least consciously) neutral but overblown intentions, that nevertheless cause individuals or groups to experience unequal treatment under the law.
By comparison, Article 14 of the ECHR seems custom made to tackle racial and religious profiling in a counter-terrorism context. It applies to any state distinction that burdens the equal enjoyment of rights, regardless of government intention. It can prohibit as unjustified the use of hysterical, unimaginative, or insensitive law enforcement techniques whose social costs outweigh their counter-terrorism benefits, even if they are the only, and thus by definition the lest restrictive, techniques the police can think of. In short, if the evidence in a given case supports a finding that using a generalized racial profile in a given case overestimates the threat, only modestly advances law enforcement aims, and profoundly undermines social inclusion, Article 14 allows the courts to tell the police that if they can come up with nothing better than to stop and search every young Arab or South Asian man then they must search everyone until they think of something more effective and less divisive. 
